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CRIMINAL LAW-BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME: THE
KILLING OF A PASSIVE VICTIM-A PERFECT DEFENSE
OR A PERFECT CRIME?-State v. Norman
INTRODUCTION
Husband killing has become a fad;
wife abuse has become acceptable.1
While neither of these statements is true, each represents the
extreme side of a controversy affecting the legal profession and the
laws of this nation. In the past, the battered woman who struck
back at her abuser generally faced convictions for murder and
manslaughter. The modern trend, however, seemingly excuses the
woman who kills her then passive mate; the same mate who abused
her in the past, interpreting such conduct as self-defense. The de-
velopment of this trend is linked to the introduction of the Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome.2 The introduction of the syndrome into
evidence allows the jury to understand the defendant's past abuse
by her victim and to ponder evidence of her mental state prior to
the killing.
In State v. Norman,3 Judy Norman shot her husband to death
while he slept.' The North Carolina Court of Appeals overturned
the verdict of voluntary manslaughter finding error in the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense and ordered a
new trial.5 The court reasoned that the victim's prior threats and
abuse of the defendant provided adequate provocation for the sub-
1. See generally, A Killing Excuse, TIME, Nov. 28, 1977 at 108; see also The
Right to Kill, NEWSWEEK, Sept 1, 1975 at 69; Wives Who Batter Back; Murder or
Self Defense, VIVA, July, 1978 at 58.
2. The scholarly commentary has overwhelmingly endorsed the use of bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence. See generally Buda & Butler, The Battered
Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359,
368-378 (1984-85); Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who
Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137-144 (1985); Comment, Self-
Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 485 (1984);
Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or Be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Wife's Dilemma].
3. 89 N.C. App. 384, 366 S.E.2d 586 (1988).
4. Id. at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 589.
5. Id. at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
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sequent killing. The decision provides a unique interpretation of
"provocation" and "imminent danger" which ultimately could af-
fect the law of self-defense.
This Note will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the
decision in State v. Norman, and will discuss whether this ruling
provides solutions or further problems for the legal system in this
area of controversy. In scrutinizing what has been labeled the "bat-
tered spouse syndrome," the legal profession must answer a ques-
tion. Is the use of the syndrome creating a perfect defense or is it
opening the door to the perfect crime?
THE CASE
Judy Norman was charged with murder in the shooting death
of her husband, John Thomas "J.T." Norman. Judy and J.T.'s
marriage of twenty-five years was marred by a long history of ver-
bal and physical abuse leveled by J.T. (hereinafter decedent or
Norman) against Judy, the defendant.9 Norman, an alcoholic, re-
quired the defendant to prostitute herself everyday.' He treated
her like an animal requiring her to eat dog food out of a bowl and
sleep on a concrete floor.'0 In addition, Norman beat the defendant
"most every day" with whatever was available from his fists to a
baseball bat." He put out cigarettes on the defendant's skin and
threw food, drink, and glass in her face.' 2 Two days before Nor-
man's death, he was arrested for driving under the influence. 3
Upon release from jail the following day, Norman vented his anger
by beating the defendant continuously throughout the day. 4 An
officer called to the residence that evening, testified that the de-
fendant, battered and bruised, told him that her husband had been
6. Id.
7. Id. at 385, 366 S.E.2d at 597.
8. Id. Norman began to drink and beat defendant five years after they were
married. The couple had five children, four of whom were still living. When de-
fendant was pregnant with her youngest child, Norman beat her and kicked her
down a flight of steps, causing the baby to be born prematurely the next day.
9. Id. at 385-86, 366 S.E.2d at 587. Norman required her to make a mini-
mum of $100 dollars a day or he would beat her.
10. Id. at 386, 366 S.E.2d at 587.
11. Id.
12. Id. Defendant exhibited scars on her face from these incidents.
13. Id. at 386, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
14. Id.
[Vol. 11:263
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beating her all day and that she could not take it any longer."
However, she refused to take out a warrant fearing Norman would
kill her. 6 Later that evening the defendant was hospitalized for
taking an overdose of "nerve pills."' 7 On the day of Norman's
death, the beatings intensified, and Norman repeatedly threatened
to cut the defendant's throat, cut her heart out, and cut her
breasts off.'8 That afternoon Norman took a nap." While Norman
was asleep, the defendant went to her mother's house where she
found a gun, returned home, and shot Norman to death as he
slept.2 °
At trial, the judge instructed the jury on first degree murder,
second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter."' The jury
found Judy Norman guilty of voluntary manslaughter and she re-
ceived a six-year sentence.2 The defendant appealed alleging sev-
eral errors including the principal issue: whether the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury on self defense? 3
On appeal, the State argued that the defendant was not enti-
tled to an instruction on self-defense. "' The State contended that
as a matter of law it was unreasonable for the defendant to believe
killing the decedent was a necessity, considering the fact that the
decedent was asleep at the time of the shooting. 5
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the defendant
was entitled to an instruction of perfect self-defense where there
15. Id. at 387, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
16. Id.
17. Id. Norman interfered with the emergency personnel who were trying to
treat defendant. He was drunk and making such statements as, "If you want to
die, you deserve to die. I'll give you more pills," and "let the bitch die... She
ain't nothing but a dog. She don't deserve to live."
18. Id. at 387-88, 366 S.E.2d at 588. Norman beat the defendant all day long.
During a ride to Spartanburg (defendant driving), Norman slapped the defendant
for driving too closely and poured a beer on her head. Norman kicked the defend-
ant in the side of the head while she was driving and told her he would "cut her
breast off and shove it up her rear end."
19. Id. at 388, 366 S.E.2d at 589.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 384, 366 S.E.2d at 586.
22. Id. at 385, 366 S.E.2d at 586-87. Voluntary Manslaughter is a Class F
felony with a six-year presumptive sentence. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (1986).
23. Id. at 385, 366 S.E.2d at 587.
24. Id. at 390, 366 S.E.2d at 590. See State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 340 S.E.2d
439 (1986); State v. Wallace, 309 N.C. 141, 305 S.E.2d 548 (1983); State v. Bush,
307 N.C. 152, 297 S.E.2d 563 (1982).
25. 89 N.C. App. at 390, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
1989]
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was evidence tending to show that the defendant was suffering
from the abused spouse syndrome.2 6 The court further held that
based on the constant beatings, verbal and physical abuse, and
threats on the day of the killing, a jury could find that the defend-
ant believed it was necessary to kill the decedent to save herself
from death or serious bodily harm.27 The court also reasoned that
"although the decedent was asleep at the time the defendant shot
him, defendant's unlawful act was closely related in time to an as-
sault and threat of death by decedent against the defendant.""
The court concluded by stating the jury is to regard evidence of
battered spouse syndrome merely as some evidence to be consid-
ered in its determination as to whether a reasonable doubt exists
as to the unlawfulness of the defendant's act.29
BACKGROUND
Wife abuse in America has become a significant social prob-
lem. Some researchers have estimated that twenty-eight million
married women suffer abuse at the hands of their husbands.30 Un-
fortunately, such domestic violence often culminates with the wo-
man killing her mate. 1 The source of violence cannot be blamed
on the legal system. However, the growth of domestic violence
seems to be linked to the legal system's inability to deal with the
problem of wife abuse.2 Police have been criticized for taking the
role as primarily a mediator or peacemaker in domestic disputes.3
Consequently, arrests in those instances rarely occur.3 4 Also, prose-
cutors and judges are criticized for exhibiting a non-interventionist
and non-responsive attitude toward domestic disputes." These at-
titudes, along with the unwillingness of family law courts to issue
26. Id. at 384, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
29. Id. at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
30. LANGLEY & LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 12 (New York, E. P.
Dutton, 1977).
31. See Roy, Some Thoughts Regarding the Criminal Justice System and
Wife Beating, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, 139 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
32. F. BAILEY & K. FISHMAN, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: HOMICIDE AND ASSAULT,
§ 628.1 at 164 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter BAILEY & FISHMAN].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. See generally Advice for Prosecutors, 70 ABA J. 27, (Dec. 1984).
266 [Vol. 11:263
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protective orders, have played a role in the growth of domestic vio-
lence. 6 In light of the legal system's ineffectiveness, women have
found it necessary to physically defend themselves. 7 Often this re-
sort to self-help leads to the prosecution of these women for mur-
der and manslaughter. 8 The growing number of homicide and
manslaughter cases involving rape victims and battered women as
defendants is well documented.39 Studies, such as the one con-
ducted at Chicago's Cook County Jail, have shown that large num-
bers of women are convicted and sentenced for having murdered
husbands or boyfriends who were physically and sexually abusive.40
A study of 132 women in Chicago's Cook County Jail serving time
for murder or manslaughter indicated that forty percent of the
women had killed lovers who had subjected them to physical
abuse."1
In the last ten years, the prosecution of battered women for
the killing of their assailants has generated a great deal of contro-
versy in both society and the legal profession.4 One difficulty with
these cases is that they "often involve sympathetic defendants who
cannot fairly be blamed for their conduct, but who have no defense
if the law is strictly applied.""3 In the late 1970's defense lawyers
began to explore new avenues in defending battered women
charged with criminal homicide. 4 The right of self-defense for
women first received national attention in the rape cases of Joan
Little and Inez Garcia, both of whom killed the men who raped or
attempted to rape them.' 5 Little, a prisoner in a North Carolina
jail, stabbed an unarmed guard who allegedly threatened to rape
36. Id. (citing Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS LAW REPORTER, 11 (Fall 1978).
37. Rosen, The Excuse of Self Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on
Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 13, (1986) [hereinafter
Rosen].
38. Id. See Woods, supra note 36, at 13, n. 39; Lidsey, When Battered
Women Strike Back: Murder or Self-Defense, VIVA (July 1978).
39. BAILEY & FISHMAN, supra note 32. See generally Lidsey, When Battered
Women Strike Back: Murder or Self-Defense? VIVA 58-59 (July 1978).
40. Id. (citing McCormick, Battered Women-The Last Resort, (Unpub-
lished study available at Cook County Department of Corrections, Ill. 1977).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 13.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Woman,
7 VT. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982).
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her. She was acquitted on the theory of self-defense despite the
arguably unequal force."' Inez Garcia was physically and sexually
assaulted by two men who threatened to return and rape her
again. 7 In response, Ms. Garcia took a shotgun and searched for
the assailants."' Upon finding one of the men, she shot and killed
him.'9 Garcia was acquitted, as the jury was allowed to consider
the men's threat to repeat the attack in determining whether her
belief in the necessity to use deadly force to avoid imminent bodily
harm was a reasonable belief.5 0
One difficult question in battered spouse cases is why the
abused woman stays with the man who abuses her. Feminists and
psychological experts report that a woman stays primarily out of
shame or fear that her husband might find her if she leaves, eco-
nomic hardship, and the woman's belief in her husband's reform. 1
Despite these reasons, the popular misconception that these
women are "sick" or "masochistic" still prevails.2
Use of the "battered spouse syndrome" as a defense has in-
creased greatly ,in the last five years.5 3 Most courts now allow the
use of expert testimony, seemingly giving legal acceptance to the
syndrome.5' Much of the success surrounding the use of the bat-
tered woman syndrome can be linked to the skillful treatment of
the jury in these cases.5 5 Understanding the broader based societal
issues has also contributed to this success.5 However, along with
the defense's success has come criticism and public concern that
"husband killing" has gotten out of hand.5 7 Some have called hus-
band killing a "fad" claiming judicial sympathy, in effect, has sanc-
46. Id. Joan Little used an icepick against the unarmed guard.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. LANGLEY & LEVY, supra note 30, at 114.
52. Id. at 123.
53. See generally, Annotation Admissability of Expert or Opinion Testi-
mony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R.4th 1153.
54. Id.
55. BAILEY & FISHMAN, supra note 32, at 166.
56. Id.
57. See generally, A Killing Excuse, TIME, Nov. 28, 1977, at 108; see also
The Right to Kill, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975 at 69; Wives Who Batter Back,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1978 at 54; When Battered Women Strike Back: Murder or
Self Defense?, VIVA, July 1978 at 54.
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tioned vengeful wives to kill and "get away with it."58 Faced with
these dilemmas, the courts continue to look for solutions.
ANALYSIS
The first and controlling issue in Norman was whether the de-
fendant was entitled to an instruction on perfect self-defense.
Before directly addressing the issue, the court explained the opera-
tion of the law of self-defense. 9 In North Carolina, the law entitles
a defendant to an instruction on perfect self-defense, as an excuse
for a killing, when at the time of the killing the following four ele-
ments existed:
(1) It appeared to the defendant and she believed it to be neces-
sary to kill the deceased in order to save herself from death
or great bodily harm; and
(2) the defendant's belief was reasonable in that the circum-
stances as they appeared to her at the time were sufficient to
create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firm-
ness; and
(3) defendant was not the aggressor in bringing on the affray,
i.e., she did not aggressively and willfully enter into the fight
without legal excuse or provocation; and
(4) defendant did not use excessive force, i.e., did not use more
force than was necessary or reasonably appeared to her to be
necessary under the circumstances to protect herself from
death or great bodily harm."
The question arising from the facts of Norman was whether
the victim's passiveness at the moment the unlawful act occurred,
precludes the defendant from asserting perfect self-defense. 1 The
first element of perfect self-defense requires that it appear to the
defendant and that the defendant actually believe it necessary to
kill the deceased, in order to save herself from death or great bod-
ily harm.2 This element requires a subjective evaluation. 3 A sub-
jective evaluation examines what the defendant actually perceived
58. Id.
59. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 384, 391, 366 S.E.2d at 590-92.
60. Id. at 390, 366 S.E.2d at 590 (citing State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 44, 357
S.E.2d 654 (1987); See State v. Mize 315 N.C. 48, 51, 340 S.E.2d 439, 442 (1986);
State v. Bush 307 N.C. 152, 158, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982) (quoting State v.
Norris 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-573 (1981)).
61. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 391, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
62. Id. at 390, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
63. Id. at 391-92, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
1989]
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at the time of the shooting."4 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
determined that the evidence would permit a jury to find that the
defendant believed it necessary to kill the victim to avoid being
killed. 5 This determination was based on the increased beatings
and the threats by decedent as well as the testimony of the defend-
ant and two expert witnesses." All of this evidence reinforced the
reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the necessity to kill the
decedent to save herself.67
The second element of perfect self-defense requires that de-
fendant's belief be reasonable in that the circumstances as they
appeared to her at the time were sufficient to create such a belief
in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.6 8 This element is
measured by an objective standard.6 9 The court of appeals cited
the record as containing sufficient evidence to warrant a finding by
the jury, who represent people of ordinary firmness, to infer that
the defendant's belief was reasonable under the circumstances."°
The court relied on evidence presented by two expert witnesses in
the field of forensic psychology, both of whom concluded that the
defendant suffered from the "abused spouse syndrome." 7 ' The ex-
perts believed the condition developed as a result of severe cycles
of violence by the decedent against the defendant. 2 Such constant
and repeated abuse caused the mental state "learned helplessness"
to develop.73 The defendant's feeling of helplessness and her in-
64. Id. at 391, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
65. Id. at 392, 366 S.E.2d at 591.
66. Id. at 392, 366 S.E.2d at 590-91.
67. Id. at 392, 366 S.E.2d at 591.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 388-90, 366 S.E.2d at 591. Dr. William Tyson concluded that the
defendant "fits and exceeds the profile of an abused or battered spouse." Dr. Ty-
son explained that in the defendant's case the situation had progressed beyond
mere "wife battering or family violence" and had become "torture, degradation
and reduction to an animal level of existence, where all behavior was marked
purely by survival. . . ." Dr. Rollins was the defendant's attending physician at
Dorothea Dix Hospital where she was sent for a psychiatric evaluation after her
arrest. Based on an examination of the defendant, laboratory studies, psychologi-
cal tests, interview and background investigation, Dr. Rollins testified that the
defendant suffered from "abused spouse syndrome".
72. Id. at 392, 366 S.E.2d at 591. See generally L. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME, 27-28 (1984).
73. See generally Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-De-
fense; A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986) [hereinafter cited
[Vol. 11:263
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ability to remove herself from the situation were cited by the court
as major factors in determining the reasonableness of her belief in
the necessity to kill her husband. 4
The third element of perfect self-defense is satisfied as long as
the defendant did not aggressively and willfully enter into the fight
without legal excuse or provocation. 5 The court of appeals noted
that in the absence of a single confrontation or affray, it is neces-
sary to measure the defendant's action "in light of the totality of
the circumstances.' '76 One circumstance considered was the inabil-
ity of the defendant to protect herself during an attack." During
an attack, a battered spouse "is immobilized by fear if not actually
physically restrained. '78 The length of time between the attack
and the time the defendant overcomes her fear raises the issue of
imminent danger. Nevertheless the court felt that based on the ev-
idence, a jury could find that the "decedent's sleep was but a mo-
mentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the decedent and
that the defendant took advantage of her first opportunity to de-
fend herself."79
The fourth element of perfect self-defense requires that the
defendant use no more force than believed to be reasonably neces-
sary to protect herself.8 0 The court of appeals in a one sentence
analysis found the final element to be satisfied; "[T]he expert tes-
timony considered with the other evidence would permit reasona-
ble minds to infer that defendant did not use more force than rea-
sonably appeared necessary to her under the circumstances to
protect herself from death or great bodily harm."'"
The court's finding in State v. Norman that the four elements
of perfect self-defense were met at the time of the killing raises a
number of questions. One broad question is whether the court's
use of the battered spouse syndrome is simply the application of
as Faigman]; See generally, Rosen, supra note 30.
74. 89 N.C. App. at 393, 366 S.E.2d at 591. See generally, Note, Jury In-
structions Given on Subjective Standard of Reasonableness in Self-Defense Do
Not Rquire a.Specific Instruction on Battered Woman Syndrome, 60 N.D.L. REV.
141, 143 n.19 (citing 34 STAN. L. REV. 615, 619 (1982) [hereinafter Note].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing State v. Kelley, 97 N.J. 178, 220, 478 A.2d 364, 325 n. 23
(1984).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
80. Id.
81. Id.
19891
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this theory to the elements of perfect self-defense or is the court in
effect creating a new defense? Some have suggested that the use of
the syndrome as a defense excuses the killing simply because of
the evil character of the victim. 2 Others see the defense as a "jux-
taposition of insanity and self-defense."" a The key concerns are
that the elements are being stretched so as to include the battered
spouse syndrome, or that they are being applied differently in the
case of an alleged battered spouse than the same elements would
be applied in any other perfect self-defense case.
The difficulty in analyzing the application of element
one-whether the defendant believed it was necessary to kill the
victim-and element two-whether the defendant's belief was rea-
sonable, is the fact that their applications are very similar. The
first element uses a subjective standard to determine what the de-
fendant actually believed." This standard is used by a minority of
the jurisdictions. 5 The objective standard, as applied to the second
element, requires that the defendant's belief, considering whether
the circumstances as they existed at the time, was sufficient to cre-
ate such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.8 6
82. See Acker & Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testi-
mony: A Comment on State v. Kelley, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 125, 146-151 (suggesting
evidence may lead juries to believe the killing was just).
83. See Vaughan & Moore, The Battered Spouse Defenses in Kentucky, 10
Ky. L. J. 399, 419 (1983).
84. 89 N.C. App. at 390, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
85. See Note, supra note 72, at 146. A split of authority exists where a de-
fendant's actions should be measured against the objective or subjective standard
of reasonableness. One commentator sets forth the standards as follows:
The minority view probably the common law rule is the subjective
standard as set forth in 40 AM. JUR.2d Homicide § 154 (1968). It holds
that a person claiming self-defense must have honestly believed she was
in imminent danger under all of the circumstances as he honestly per-
ceived them. The Model Penal Code has adopted the subjective stan-
dard. "The use of force . . .toward another person is justified when the
actor believes that such force is ... necessary for the purpose of protect-
ing himself. . . . " Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (1968).
The majority view is that the apprehension of danger and belief of
necessity must be a reasonable belief. 40 AM. JuR.2d Homicide § 1 (1968).
The prevalent view is that an honest but unreasonable belief concerning
the necessity of self-defense merely negates malice aforethought and
reduces the offense to voluntary manslaughter.
Note, Battered Woman Sundrome: Admissibility of Expert Testimony for the
Defense, 47 Mo. L. REV. 835, 843 N. 50 (1982).
86. Id.
272 [Vol. 11:263
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Most courts use either the objective or the subjective test while
North Carolina uses both tests." In applying the objective stan-
dard, a jury is required "to consider only the acts and circum-
stances surrounding the accused at or immediately before the time
of the killing from the standpoint of a reasonable and prudent per-
son." 88 The subjective standard when applied to the second ele-
ment, on the other hand, required the jury to decide whether the
circumstances surrounding the accused were sufficient to induce an
honest and reasonable belief in her mind that she must use force
to defend herself. 9
The court of appeals in Norman stated clearly that "the sec-
ond element of [perfect] self-defense . ..is measured by the ob-
jective standard .... "90 Nevertheless, the court analyzed the sec-
ond element with a standard very similar to the subjective
standard. The court began its analysis by citing evidence of the
repeated cycles of violence by the victim toward the defendant and
discussed the defendant's state of "learned helplessness." 91 The ev-
idence went directly to the honesty and the reasonableness of the
defendant's belief, tending to show the subjective standard was ap-
plied. The objective standard, however, is concerned with what a
person with a mind of ordinary firmness would believe to be rea-
sonable under the circumstances. The court of appeals applied the
objective standard only nominally by allowing the jury to consider
many of the defendant's unique circumstances thereby evaluating
the resonableness of the action as the defendant saw it. The court
either applied the subjective standard or stretched the objective
standard in such a manner as to remove the test's objectivity. By
placing the jury in the shoes of the defendant, the jury would be
prevented from answering the question objectively. At best, a jury
would be faced with the impossible task of determining what a rea-
sonable person suffering from the abused spouse syndrome would
believe. The extension of the objective test in this manner man-
dates the assumption that a person of ordinary firmness would fall
prey to the syndrome. Such an assumption is questionable at best
and is unfounded in the absence of scientific evidence or discussion
on the point.
87. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 391-92, 366 S.E.2d at 590-91.
88. Note, supra note 74, at 146.
89. Id.
90. 89 N.C. App. at 392, 366 S.E.2d at 591.
91. Id.
1989]
11
Cutler: Criminal Law - Battered Woman Syndrome: The Killing of a Passive
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
In addition to applying a subjective standard to the second
element of perfect self-defense, the court of appeals examined the
theory of "learned helplessness" as evidence to support the reason-
ableness of the defendant's conduct.92 "Learned helplessness"
causes the battered woman to believe she is helpless to remove
herself from this brutal situation.93 The court stated that this vul-
nerability must be considered in determining the reasonableness of
the defendant's actions. 4 "Learned helplessness" does explain the
reasonableness of the defendant's feeling of vulnerability; however,
it fails to explain the reasonableness of the defendant's action of
killing her husband while he slept. Theoretically, it is inconsistent
for a woman, who is helpless and unable to improve her situation,
to assert such a "positive control over her situation as to kill her
batterer."95
The effect of the court of appeals ruling in State v. Norman is
difficult to predict. The unique analysis of the second element of
perfect self-defense raises several questions. How will the ruling
affect future applications of the elements of perfect self-defense?
In answering this question, one should not forget that this ruling
and analysis only entitle the defendant to an instruction on perfect
self-defense; it does not excuse her actions. One effect of the ruling
will be a broadening of the evidence permitted regarding the de-
fendant's actual beliefs. The ruling also raises questions as to
whether the court correctly applied the objective standard to the
second element of perfect self-defense. Further, this ruling begs
the question: should the court in fact apply the subjective stan-
dard? Or has the court created a new standard by which to inter-
pret the element. The answers to these questions will affect the
future application of the elements of perfect self-defense. Despite
possible negative effects, the Norman ruling provides battered
women with the opportunity to explain their actions. If the court
has erred, they have erred properly on behalf of the defendant, a
proposition upon which our legal system is based. Another issue
raised by the court of appeals' ruling deals with the third element
of self-defense relating to provocation. How could the defendant
have been provoked by the sleeping Mr. Norman? In analyzing
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. See generally, supra note 74.
95. See Faigman, supra note 73, at 641. See generally R. GELLES & C. COR-
NELL, Intimate Violence in Families, 63-81 (1985). "Most battered women are far
from passive." Id. at 77.
[Vol. 11:263
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss2/5
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
this element the court relied on the "cycle theory" of the battered
woman syndrome.9 6 One premise behind this theory is that at the
moment of attack, the battered woman is least likely to counter
because she is immobilized by fear." The court stated that, once
the fear has subsided, the battered spouse need not wait for a
deadly attack to occur." This type of "preventive" self-defense has
been adopted by other state courts. 9 Nevertheless, the defendant
is required to show some apparent or immediate danger. 100 This
presents a problem because "frequently a battered woman kills her
mate after an attack has ended or sometimes when seemingly no
threat is present. 10 1 Furthermore, a battered woman would appear
to always have the alternative of leaving the violent relationship
instead of killing.10 2 Yet, a majority of jurisdictions, including
North Carolina, impose no duty to retreat if the aggressor employs
96. 89 N.C. App at 393, 366 S.E.2d at 591. See Faigman, supra note 73, at
627 (citing L. Walker (1984), supra note 72). A discussion of the stages of the
Walker Cycle Theory:
The Walker cycle theory forms the conceptual bridge that spans the
time gap between the batterer's threat of death or serious bodily harm
and the defendant's act. Walker describes three distinct phases of the
typical battering relationship. A "tension building phase" erupts into an
"acute battering incident," which is in turn followed by "loving contri-
tion." The first phase is marked by verbal bickering and increasing ten-
sion between the man and woman. In the second phase the batterer ex-
plodes into an uncontrollable and violent rage. In the final phase the
batterer typically expresses regret and profusely apologizes, usually
promising never to beat the woman again. Despite the man's promises
during this third phase, the cycle eventually begins anew.
According to the cycle theory, the battered woman is reduced to a
state of fear and anxiety during the first two phases of the cycle, and her
perception of danger extends beyond the time of the battering expisodes
themselves. A "cumulative terror" consumes the woman and holds her in
constant fear of harm. The fear of harm continues even during the peace-
ful interlude between episodes of abuse. It is during this peaceful inter-
lude that the woman may seize the opportunity to strike back at the
batterer.
Faigman, supra note 71, at 627.
97. Id. (citing State v. Kelley, 97 N.J. 178, 220, 478 A.2d 364, 385 n. 23
(1984).
98. Id.
99. See State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. App 1986); and State v. Al-
lery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.O. 1983).
100. See State v. Roybal, 33 N.M. 187, 262 P. 929 (1927).
101. See Faigman, supra note 72, at 621.
102. Id. at 622.
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deadly force or when the victim is in her own home."0 3 These vary-
ing factors have created a dilemma. The battered spouse syndrome
could be a solution. By using the syndrome, a defendant is able to
bring out the history of the past beatings to help the jury under-
stand the reasonableness of her actions.104 The syndrome also al-
lows the jury to understand the impending danger which the bat-
tered woman faces.10 5
The facts in State v. Norman show that the defendant be-
lieved she could not escape from the decedent's abuse.'0 These
facts are similar to those facts before the North Dakota Supreme
Court in State v. Leidholm,'0 7 which also involved a battered
spouse who killed her husband as he slept. 08 The North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that where the facts and circumstances are
sufficient to create a reasonable and honest belief in the mind of
the accused that she cannot retreat from the assailant with safety,
her use of deadly force is justified or excused.10 9 Other courts have
excused the use of deadly force in response to threatening commu-
nications and gestures, where the accused could perceive impend-
ing danger based on prior attacks."10 In summary, courts have
103. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53 at 391. The
law's attitude toward the duty to retreat reflects the tensions underlying the self-
defense doctrine generally. On one hand, an individual should be encouraged to
retreat in order to avoid injury to herself or the aggressor. At the same time, one
who is attacked should not be required to adopt a cowardly or humiliating pos-
ture. The majority of American jurisdictions impose no duty to retreat if the ag-
gressor employs deadly force and the defender reasonably believes that she is in
danger of death or serious bodily injury. A substantial minority of states, however,
requires the defending party to retreat if she can do so in complete safety. Id. at
395-96.
An. individual has no duty to retreat if attacked by an intruder in her home.
Courts are divided, though, on whether there is an obligation to retreat when the
assailant is a co-occupant of the dwelling. Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat
Where Assailant and Assailed Share the Same Living Quarters, 26 A.L.R.3d.
1296 (1969). A majority of jurisdictions do not require retreat when the assault
occurs within the home and the assailant is a co-occupant. The rationale for this
position apparently is that the defender has no safer place to which she can
escape.
104. Norman, 89 N.C. App at 392, 393, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 388.
107. 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
108. Id. at 813.
109. Id. at 821;.
110. See State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1271 (citing State v. Walker, 40 Wash.
App 658, 700 P.2d 1168 (1985).
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placed a greater emphasis on the probability that an attack will
occur and the impending nature of an attack, and place less em-
phasis on the immediacy of an attack or whether an attack was
actually occurring."' In finding "the decedent's sleep was but a
momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror," the court of
appeals in State v. Norman ruled in accordance with other juris-
dictions in finding sufficient provocation." 2
The decision of the court of appeals in State v. Norman
should be affirmed. The court neither stretches the law nor does it
create a new defense for battered women. The court simply and
masterfully applied the facts of the case to the law. The difficulty
was not in applying the law but in understanding how the facts
should be applied to the law. The effects of this ruling are uncer-
tain. The obvious is a beneficial effect on the plight of battered
women who strike back.'1 3
CONCLUSION
Upon applying the theories of the battered spouse syndrome
to the elements of perfect self-defense, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals granted Judy Norman a new trial. The error was the
failure by the trial court to instruct the jury on perfect self-de-
fense. As the court warned, the law should never casually permit
the unlawful killing of another human being. Yet, it is the court's
responsibility to insure with equal vigor that innocent victims of
abuse are entitled to defend themselves. The realities of an abusive
relationship force the court to apply the elements of self-defense
subjectively. This subjectivity raises questions regarding the appli-
cation of the elements of self-defense and whether a special de-
fense has been created for battered women.
The ruling in State v. Norman is a step in the right direction
in helping victims of abuse; however, the abuse itself is the root of
the problem. Society will be better served if the legislature, law
enforcement agencies, social service agencies, and the courts work
111. Id. at 1271. See State v. Liedholm, 33 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983); See gen-
erally, Note, Wife's Diemma, supra note 2.
112. 89 N.C. App at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
113. State v. Norman was under consideration by the North Carolina Su-
preme court of the time of publication of volume 11 of the CAMPBELL LAW
REVIEW.
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together to deal with the problem and protection of battered
women.
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